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The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project was initiated by the NIMH as a way of explaining
and understanding the etiology and pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders at a brain-systems
level (Insel et al., 2010; Casey et al., 2013, 2014). By identifying dysfunctional neural circuits
and networks, the RDoC aims to provide a framework promoting more accurate diagnosis and
prognosis and specify targets that could predict responses to therapeutic interventions for these
disorders. This is an improvement over the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5), which focuses on symptoms rather than causes.
Jacqueline Sullivan argues that there is a lack of explanatory and conceptual integration in
the RDoC (Sullivan, 2016). Its success as a theoretical model for explaining neuropsychiatric
disorders depends on collectively stabilizing valid constructs across different research fields in
the mind-brain sciences. One feature of this stabilizing strategy is connecting functional analysis
with mechanistic explanations (Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008), which “identify the physical parts
(e.g., systems, cells, molecules) and processes (e.g., activation, firing, phosphorylation) that realize
organism-level functions.” Presumably, explanations in neuroscience are mechanistic. Yet by
focusing only on neural parts and processes, these explanations provide at best an incomplete
account of the development of psychiatric disorders and the experience of the people who
have them. They are too limited to explain the extent to which biological, psychological, and
environmental factors influence neural function and dysfunction and the role of these factors
in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of these disorders. Sullivan acknowledges criticism of the
RDoC as “braincentric” and “decontextualizing mental disorders from their bodily, social, and
environmental contexts” (Whooley, 2014; Bernard and Mittal, 2015). Although the integrative
aspect of mechanistic explanations may strengthen the RDoC as a theoretical construct, they
cannot fully explain the onset and severity of conditions such as depression, anxiety, schizophrenia,
or variable patient responses to therapeutic interventions for them. Mechanistic explanations
from cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience fall short of providing a satisfactory
Glannon Commentary: Stabilizing Constructs through Consolidation
psycho-biological framework in which to gain a better
understanding of healthy and diseased brains. This is more
likely to come from observing and treating actual subjects and
patients in psychiatric research and clinical psychiatry.
Mechanistic explanations emphasize bottom-up causation
in which lower-level physical parts and processes realize
higher-level physical functions. They fail to capture the bi-
directional bottom-up and top-down causal relations between
psychological and neural properties in brain-mind and mind-
brain interaction. They also fail to capture how other bodily
systems and a person’s response to the environment can
influence the activity of neural circuits and networks. For
example, acute or chronic psychosocial stress can cause
dysregulation in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis
(Hohne et al., 2014). This can induce sleep, cognitive, and
mood disturbances and other symptoms associated with major
depression and generalized anxiety. Such dysregulation can
result in an adverse biochemical environment in the brain
with high circulating levels of norepinephrine released from
the adrenal medulla and cortisol released from the adrenal
cortex. A prolonged period of excess cortisol may subsequently
result in neuronal and synaptic degeneration in the prefrontal
cortex and further deleterious effects on cognition, mood, and
motivation. Psychosocial stress may also cause hyper-activation
of the amygdala and dysregulated fear processing associated
with anxiety and panic disorders (LeDoux, 2003). Stressors in
the womb can adversely affect fetal brain development and
eventually result in neurodevelopmental disorders. On the other
hand, cognitive-behavioral therapy may enable some persons
with depression to modulate prefrontal cortical function in
ameliorating symptoms (Goldapple et al., 2004). This is an
example of salutary psycho-biological interaction and top-down
neuromodulating effects of psychological states in rewiring
brain circuits. In one form of neuro-immune interaction,
viral infections can induce neural endothelial and epithelial
cells to release proinflammatory cytokines and cause abnormal
metabolism of serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine in the
brain. These cytokines can be psychoactive and induce abnormal
emotional states and behavioral changes (Miller et al., 2009).
All of these examples illustrate that endocrine, immune, and
environmental systems outside the brain can interact with and
alter systems inside the brain. These phenomena cannot be
explained in terms of parts and processes in the brain alone.
Nor do mechanistic explanations adequately account for
the epigenetics of depression. They do not consider how
environmental exposures can alter chromatin structure in gene
expression in determining the lifetime risk of depression or
its severity in those who develop it (Nestler, 2014). Dynamic
patterns of gene regulation in response to internal cues such as
hormones, neurotransmitters, or cellular states, and external cues
in the form of environmental stress, can influence genetic factors
regulating neural activity. Explanations focusing on physical
parts and processes in the brain fail to consider the influence of
these external cues on neural function and dysfunction.
The success of the RDoC in psychiatry will not depend
on the theoretical issue of whether it allows for the collective
stabilization of valid constructs for conceptual and explanatory
integration. Specifically, it will not depend on mechanistic
explanations. Rather, it will depend on the combined theoretical
and practical issue of whether investigation of neural circuits
and networks results in more accurate diagnosis, prognosis and
more effective therapies for, and ideally prevention of, diseases
of the brain-mind. This would enable the RDoC to achieve or at
least approximate the goal of reducing the global burden of these
diseases and improving quality of life for the millions of people
who suffer from them. Sullivan’s proposed stabilizing project
may improve the RDoC as a conceptual model for cognitive
neuroscience. Yet while the RDoC considers environmental and
other factors outside the brain among its domains and is not
strictly reductive, it does not adequately appreciate the degree to
which psychosocial factors in particular contribute to psychiatric
disorders. It is an incomplete model for explaining them. This
requires a more comprehensive model that includes the full
extent of interaction between and among the central nervous
and other bodily systems, and especially interaction between the
person constituted by these systems and the environment. To
reduce the magnitude of harm from mental illness, psychiatrists
need to focus not just on neural parts and the integrated neural
functions in which they are realized but also on the whole
neurobiological-psychological-environmental context in which
people are affected by it.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
approved it for publication.
REFERENCES
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive
Neuroscience. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis.
Bernard, J. A., and Mittal, V. A. (2015). Updating the research domain
criteria: the utility of a motor dimension. Psychol. Med. 45, 2685–2689. doi:
10.1017/S0033291715000872
Casey, B. J., Craddock, N., Cuthbert, B. N., Hyman, S. E., Lee, F. S., and Ressler, K. J.
(2013). DSM-5 and RDoC: progress in psychiatry research? Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
14, 810–814. doi: 10.1038/nrn3621
Casey, B. J., Oliveri, M., and Insel, T. (2014). A neurodevelopmental perspective on
the research domain criteria (RDoC) framework. Biol. Psychiatry 76, 350–353.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2014.01.006
Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of
Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldapple, K., Segal, Z., Garson, C., Lau, M., Bieling, P., Kennedy, S., et al. (2004).
Modulation of cortical-limbic pathways inmajor depression: treatment-specific
effects of cognitive behavior therapy. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 61, 34–41. doi:
10.1001/archpsyc.61.1.34
Hohne, N., Poidinger, M., Merz, F., Pfister, H., Bruckl, T.,
Zimmerman, P., et al. (2014). Increased HPA axis response to
psychosocial stress in remitted depression: the influence of coping
style. Biol. Psychol. 103, 267–275. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.
09.008
Insel, T., Cuthbert, B., Garvey, M., Heinssen, R., Pine, D. S., and Quinn, K.,
et al (2010). Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): toward a new classification
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 July 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 363
Glannon Commentary: Stabilizing Constructs through Consolidation
framework for research on mental disorders. Am. J. Psychiatry 167, 748–751.
doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2010.09091379
LeDoux, J. (2003). The emotional brain, fear, and the amygdala. Cell. Mol.
Neurobiol. 23, 727–738. doi: 10.1023/A:1025048802629
Miller, A. H., Maletic, V., and Raison, C. L. (2009). Inflammation and
its discontents: the role of cytokines in the pathophysiology of major
depression. Biol. Psychiatry 65, 732–749. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.
11.029
Nestler, E. (2014). Epigenetic mechanisms of depression. JAMA Psychiatry 71,
454–456. doi: 10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2013.4291
Sullivan, J. A. (2016). Stabilizing constructs through collaboration across
different research fields as a way to foster the integrative approach of the
Research Doman Criteria (RDoC) project. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 10:309. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2016.00309
Whooley, O. (2014). Nosological reflections: the failure of DSM-5, the emergence
of RDoC, and the decontextualization of mental distress. Soc. Mental Health 4,
92–110. doi: 10.1177/2156869313519114
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Glannon. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 363
